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ABSTRACT
Matlab/Simulink is a development and simulation language that is
widely used by the Cyber-Physical System (CPS) industry to model
dynamical systems. There are two mainstream approaches to ver-
ify CPS Simulink models: model testing that attempts to identify
failures in models by executing them for a number of sampled test
inputs, and model checking that attempts to exhaustively check the
correctness of models against some given formal properties. In this
paper, we present an industrial Simulink model benchmark, provide
a categorization of different model types in the benchmark, describe
the recurring logical patterns in the model requirements, and dis-
cuss the results of applying model checking and model testing
approaches to identify requirements violations in the benchmarked
models. Based on the results, we discuss the strengths and weak-
nesses of model testing and model checking. Our results further
suggest that model checking and model testing are complementary
and by combining them, we can significantly enhance the capa-
bilities of each of these approaches individually. We conclude by
providing guidelines as to how the two approaches can be best
applied together.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The development of Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) relies on early
function modeling of the system and its environment. These models
typically capture dynamical systems. For example, they may be
mathematical models capturing movements of a physical object or
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they may specify a software controller that interacts with a physical
object or a physical process to respectively control the movements
of the object or the progression of the process over time. A key and
common feature of these models is that they typically consist of
time-varying and real-valued variables and functions.
Matlab/Simulink is a development and simulation language that
is widely used by the CPS industry to capture CPS dynamical sys-
tems. Specifically, Simulink is used by more than 60% of engineers
for simulation of CPS [10, 42], and is the prevalent modeling lan-
guage in the automotive domain [31, 41]. Simulink appeals to engi-
neers since it is particularly suitable for specifying mathematical
models and dynamic systems, and further, it is executable and al-
lows engineers to test their models as early as possible.
To avoid ripple effects from defects and to ensure that failures are
identified as early as possible, it is paramount for the CPS industry
to ensure that CPS Simulink models satisfy their functional safety
requirements. Different approaches to verification and testing of
Simulink models have been proposed in the literature [5, 11, 21, 28].
The majority of them fall under one of the following two main
categories: (1) Model checking techniques that attempt to exhaus-
tively verify the correctness of models against some given formal
properties [15]. (2)Model testing techniques that attempt to identify
failures in models by executing them for some test inputs sam-
pled by a guided randomized algorithm [5, 12, 28]. Model checking
approaches often translate Simulink models as well as the given
properties into the input language of some existing model checkers
or Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers. The main disad-
vantage of model checking when applied to Simulink models is
that these models often capture continuous dynamic and hybrid
systems [8]. It is well-known that model checking such systems
is in general undecidable [7, 9, 22]. The translation of continuous
systems into discrete logic often has to be handled on a case-by-
case basis and involves loss of precision which may or may not be
acceptable depending on the application domain. Further, indus-
trial Simulink models often contain features and constructs that
cannot easily be translated into low-level logic-based languages.
Such features include third-party code (often encapsulated in Mat-
lab S-Functions) and non-algebraic arithmetics (e.g., trigonometric,
exponential, and logarithmic functions). Nevertheless, model check-
ing, when applicable, can both detect faults and demonstrate lack
thereof. Model testing, on the other hand, due to its black-box na-
ture, does not suffer from such applicability and scalability issues,
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Figure 1: Simulink Model Verification: (a) Model testing and
(b) Model checking.
but it can only show the presence of failures and not their absence.
The effectiveness of model testing techniques highly relies on their
underlying heuristics and search guidance strategies. Since there
is no theoretically proven way to assess and compare different
search heuristics, model testing techniques can only be evaluated
empirically.
In addition to model checking and model testing, statistical
model checking has also been previously applied to Simulink mod-
els [25, 40]. This technique aims to provide probabilistic guarantees,
subject to assumptions about the distribution of system inputs, in-
dicating that a model satisfies its given formal properties [40, 43].
Specifically, statistical model checking uses uniformly sampled ex-
ecution traces generated by the model under test together with
statistical inference methods to determine whether the sampled
traces provide a statistical evidence for the satisfaction of the prop-
erties of interest [14, 43]. Similar to model testing, statistical model
checking has a black-box nature. However, in contrast to bothmodel
testing and model checking that can be used in early verification to
find failures, statistical model checking is targeted towards software
validation activities and produces probabilistic estimates about the
correctness of models.
Despite the large volume of academic research on software
testing and verification, there are relatively few commercial and
industry-strength tools for testing and verification ofMatlab/Simulink
models. In particular, we identify three major commercial tools for
testing Matlab/Simulink models: Reactis [16, 38], Simulink Design
Verifier (SLDV) [39] and QVTrace [4]. Among these tools, Reactis
combines a guided random search strategy with coverage-based
SMT model checking. Specifically, Reactis first generates test in-
puts randomly. Then, the coverage goals that are not covered by
the randomly generated inputs are attempted to be covered us-
ing SMT-based model checking. SLDV and QVTrace, on the other
hand, are SMT-based model checkers designed for Simulink models.
Specifically, formal properties together with the models are trans-
lated into logical constraints that can be fed into SMT solvers. The
SMT solvers then attempt to verify that given formal properties
hold on the models, or otherwise, they generate counter-examples
demonstrating the presence of faults in the models.
In this paper, we report on an empirical study evaluating capa-
bilities of model testing and model checking techniques in finding
faults in Simulink models. Specifically, we use a benchmark con-
sisting of Simulink models from the CPS industry in our empirical
study to compare the two approaches. The benchmark is devel-
oped by a well-known and major aerospace and defense company
(hereafter referred to as company A [real name redacted due to
NDA]). The benchmark includes eleven Simulink models that are
representative of different types of CPS behavioral models in the
aerospace and defense sector. Each model is accompanied by a set of
functional requirements described in natural language that must be
satisfied by the model. Each model further includes some faults that
violate some of the model requirements. The faults in the models
are introduced by company A based on their past experiences of
common faults in CPS behavioral design models. Without revealing
the locations and types of faults in the models, company A uses this
benchmark to assess the capabilities of different verification and
testing tools in the market. Testing tool vendors are requested to
identify as many requirements violations as possible when provided
with the benchmark. The benchmark is available online [2].
The model testing technique in our study builds on our prior
work in this area [28] and is implemented as a typical search-
based testing framework [33]. An overview of this framework is
shown in Figure 1(a). In this framework, meta-heuristic search al-
gorithms [26] are used to explore the test input space and to select
the best test inputs, i.e., the test inputs that reveal or are close to
revealing requirements violations. The search is guided by fitness
functions that act as distance functions and estimate how far test
inputs are from violating a certain requirement. In this paper, we
use a search algorithm based on Hill Climbing heuristic [26] that, in
prior work [32], has shown to be effective in testing Simulink mod-
els. We define search fitness functions using existing translations
of logical formulas into quantitative functions estimating degrees
of satisfaction of the formulas [5].
Among the commercial model checking tools for Simulink mod-
els (i.e., QVTrace and SLDV), we use the QVTrace tool [4] in our
comparison. QVTrace is a recent commercial tool that builds on the
ideas from SMT-based model checking. SLDV, similar to QVTrace,
is a SMT-based model checker. However, we chose to compare
with QVTrace since the MathWorks license prevents publication of
empirical results comparing with SLDV or any other MathWorks
products. In contrast to SLDV, QVTrace is a standalone product
developed by QRA [3], a Canada-based company specializing in
the development of enterprise tools for early-stage validation and
verification of critical systems. We further note that QVTrace is
more recent than SLDV, has a wider range of features and benefits
from a well-designed and usable interface. In contrast to SLDV
that can only be used with Prover [37], QVTrace can be combined
with various well-known SMT solvers and theorem provers such
as Z3 [17] and Mathematica [1].
Our paper presents the following main results:
• We provide a categorization of CPS model types and a set
of common logical patterns in CPS functional requirements.
Specifically, using our industrial benchmark Simulink mod-
els, we identify a categorization of the CPS models based
on their functions. We further formalize the textual require-
ments in a logic-based requirements language and identify
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some common patterns among the CPS requirements in the
benchmark.
• We present the results of applying our model testing and
model checking techniques to the Simulink benchmark. We
evaluate the fault finding abilities of both techniques. This
is a first attempt in the context of CPS, to systematically
compare model checking and model testing – the two main
alternatives for verifying Simulink models – on an industrial
benchmark. The complete replication package for our study
is available online (see Section 5.3) [2].
• We provide some lessons learned by outlining the strengths
and weaknesses of model testing andmodel checking in iden-
tifying faults in Simulink models. As these two approaches
provide complementary benefits, we believe that integrat-
ing them in a comprehensive verification framework can
result in an effective testing framework. We further propose
some guidelines as to how the two approaches can be best
applied together. Finally, we describe some directions for
future work in this area.
Organization. Section 2 presents our Simulink model benchmark,
our CPS model categorization and our CPS requirements patterns.
Section 3 summarizes the working of QVTrace, i.e., the model
checking tool used in our study. Section 4 describes our model
testing approach. Section 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6
discusses some lessons learned. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 SIMULINK BENCHMARK
In this section, we present the CPS Simulink models and the CPS re-
quirements in our Simulink benchmark. Table 1 shows a summary
of the models in the benchmark. In Section 2.1, we present two
example models from the benchmark in more detail. In Section 2.2,
we categorize the benchmark models based on their functions. In
Section 2.3, we describe the logic language to formalize our CPS re-
quirements and present a number of recurring logic-based patterns
in the requirements formalizations.
2.1 Example Models
We highlight two example Simulink models from the benchmark:
Two-Tanks [20] and Autopilot. These two models represent two com-
plete systems instead of components of a system. The two-tanks
system contains two separate tanks holding liquid and connected
via a pipe. The flow of incoming liquid into the first tank is con-
trolled using a pump. The flow of liquid from the first tank to the
second is controlled using a valve, and the flow of outgoing liquid
from the second tank is controlled using two different valves: one
that lets liquid out in normal situations, and the other that is opened
only in emergency conditions to avoid liquid overflow. The model
of the two-tanks system includes one controller model for each
tank that monitors the liquid height using three different sensors
located at different heights in each tank. Depending on the liquid
heights, each controller chooses to open or close valves to control
the incoming/outgoing liquid flows. The two-tanks model further
includes a complete model of the environment (i.e., the tanks and
their sensors and actuators).
Controller Actuator
Plant
(a) Open-Loop
Controller Actuator
Plant
(b) Feedback-Loop
Sensors
Commands Commands
Feedback
Figure 2: Generic structure of (a) open-loop and (b) feedback-
loop CPS models
The autopilot system is a full six degree of freedom simulation
of a single-engined high-wing propeller-driven airplane with au-
topilot. A six degree of freedom simulation enables movement and
rotation of a rigid body in three-dimensional space. The autopilot
simulator model is able to control the plane body to change position
as forward/backward (surge), up/down (heave) and left/right (sway)
in three perpendicular axes, combined with changes in orientation
through rotation in three perpendicular axes, often termed yaw
(normal axis), pitch (transverse axis) and roll (longitudinal axis).
The autopilot model further captures a physical model of the air-
plane (i.e., a plant model) as well as environment aspects impacting
airplane movements such as wind speed.
Both two-tanks and autopilot models use closed-loop controllers.
However, the two-tanks controllers are modelled as discrete state
machines, while the autopilot model consists of six continuous PID
controllers [35]. Some requirements of both models are described
in Table 2.
2.2 CPS Simulink Models Categorization
In the CPS domain, engineers use the Simulink language to capture
dynamic systems [8]. Dynamic systems are usually used to model
controller components as well as external components and the en-
vironment aspects that are to be controlled. The latter components
are typically referred to as plants. Dynamic systems’ behaviors
vary over time, and hence, their inputs and outputs are represented
as signals (i.e., functions over time). We describe some common
categories of dynamical system components that we have identi-
fied based on our industrial benchmark as well as Simulink models
from other industrial sources [29]. We divide models into two large
categories of open-loop and feedback-loop models:
(1) Open-loop models do not use measurements of the states or
outputs of plants to make decisions [8]. For example, an electronic
cloth dryer controller that relies on time to change its states is
an open loop model. The user sets a timer for the controller, and
the dryer will automatically stop at the end of the specified time,
even if the clothes are still wet. The design of such controllers
heavily relies on the assumption that the behavior of the plant
is entirely predictable or determined. Figure 2(a) represents the
generic structure of open-loop models.
(2) Feedback-loop models use measurements of the outputs or
the states of plants to make decisions [8]. This is the most com-
mon case in practical applications where engineers need to design
system controllers that act on some controlled inputs depending
on the current state of the plants. For example, an electronic cloth
dryer controller that is able to stop when the clothes are sufficiently
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Table 1: Important characteristics of our benchmark Simulink models (from left to right): (1) model name, (2) model descrip-
tion, (3) model type (see Section 2.2), and (4) number of atomic blocks in the model.
Model Name Model Description Model Type #Atomic
Blocks
Autopilot Discussed in Section 2.1. Feedback-loop, continuous controller,
plant model, non-linear, non-algebraic,
matrix operations
1549
Neural Network A two-input single-output predictor neural network model with two hidden layers arranged in a feed-
forward neural network architecture.
Open-loop, machine learning 704
Tustin A numeric model that computes integral over time. Open-loop, non-linear (saturation and
switches)
57
Regulators A PID controller without the plant model. Open-loop, continuous controller, non-
linear (saturation, switches)
308
Nonlinear Guidance A non-linear guidance algorithm that guides an Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to follow a moving
target respecting a specific safety distance.
Open-loop, non-linear (polynomial,
switches)
373
System Wide Integrity Mon-
itor (SWIM)
A numerical algorithm that computes warning to an operator when the airspeed is approaching a boundary
where an evasive fly up manoeuvre cannot be achieved.
Open-loop, non-linear (sqrt, switches) 164
Effector Blender A control allocation method, which enables the calculation of the optimal effector configuration for a
vehicle.
Open-loop, non-linear (polynomial), ma-
trix operations, non-algebraic (exponential
functions)
95
Two Tanks Discussed in Section 2.1. Feedback-loop, sate machine, non-linear
(switches)
498
Finite State Machine (FSM) A finite state machine executing in real-time. Its main function is to put the control of aircraft in the
autopilot mode if a hazardous situation is identified in the pilot cabin (e.g., the pilot not being in charge
of guiding the airplane)
Open-loop, sate machine, non-linear
(switches)
303
Euler An open-loop mathematical model that generates three-dimensional rotation matrices along the z-y- and
x-axes of an Inertial frame in a Euclidean space.
Open-loop, non-algebraic (trigonometry),
non-linear (polynomial), matrix opera-
tions
834
Triplex A monitoring system that receives three different sensor readings from three redundant sensors used in a
safety critical system. It determines, based on the values and differences of three values received at each
time step, which sensor readings are trusted and what values should be sent to the safety critical system.
Open-loop, state machine, non-linear
(switches)
481
Table 2: Example requirements for the TwoTanks and Autopilot models.
Model ID Requirement Signal Temporal Logic formula (STL) *
Two Tanks R1 If the liquid height of the first tank is greater than or equal to the position of
the top sensor of the first tank, then the top sensor should return an active
(TRUE) state to the system.
G[0,T ](tank1height ≥ tank1topSensor ⇒ tank1sensorHValue = 1)
Two Tanks R2 When the tank 2 MID sensor is TRUE, the tank 2 HIGH sensor is FALSE, and
the emergency valve was previously open, then the emergency valve and the
production valve (outflow valves) shall be commanded to be OPEN.
G[0,T ]((tank2sensorMValue = 1) ∧ (tank2sensorHValue = 0) ∧
(eValveStatePrev = 1) ⇒ (eValveState = 1) ∧ (pValveState = 1))
Autopilot R1 The controller output will reach and stabilize at the desired output value within
%1 precision and within T seconds (steady-state requirement).
F[0,T ]G[0,T ] |out − desired | ≤ 0.01
Autopilot R2 Once the difference between the output and the desired value reaches less than
%1, this difference shall not exceed 10% overshoot.
G[0,T ](|out − desired | ≤ 0.01 ⇒ G[0,T ] |out − desired | ≤ 0.1)
* Described in Section 2.3. The variable T indicates the simulation time.
dried without requiring the user to set a timer, works by continu-
ously monitoring the status of the clothes to choose when to stop
the dryer. Such controllers are more flexible and are better able
to handle unpredictable environment situations and disturbances.
Figure 2(b) represents the generic structure of closed-loop models.
CPS models, whether being open-loop or feedback-loop, may
consist of several components conforming to one or more of the
following computation types:
State machines. State machines are used for modeling discrete
and high-level controllers. They can be used to monitor system
behaviour or to control the system either in an open loop or closed
loop model. Three models in our benchmark use state machines:
(1) Triplex is implemented using a state machine to monitor three
different sensor readings from three redundant sensors and identi-
fies errors in the sensor readings; (2) FSM uses an open-loop state
machine controller to automatically put the control of aircraft in
the autopilot mode if a hazardeous situation is identified in the
pilot cabin; (3) Two Tanks (discussed in Section 2.1) is implemented
as a composition of two state machine controllers for each tank
arranged in a feedback-loop architecture together with physical
models of the two tanks. Each state machine controls pumps and
valves of one tank. Since the pumps and valves can only have two
states (i.e., on and off), they can be controlled using state machines
with a few states. In general, state machines are useful to model
systems that have a clearly identifiable set of states and transitions
that, when fired, change the state of the system.
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Continuous behaviors. Continuous mathematical models are used
to describe both software controllers and physical plants. Con-
tinuous controllers, also known as proportional-integral-derivative
PID-controllers [35], are suitable when we need to control objects
or processes whose states continuously vary over time. PID con-
trollers are often used to control speed and movements of objects
operating in varying environments with unpredictable disturbances.
For example, the autopilot controller in Table 1 contains six PID
controllers. Plant models, which are required for simulation of
feedback-loop controllers, are typically described using continuous
mathematical models. Continuous operations used in these two
categories of models may have to be replaced with their discrete
counterparts before the models can be translated into logic-based
languages so that they can be analyzed by SMT-solvers. Though
continuous controllers also need to be discretized for code genera-
tion purposes, this is not the case of plant models, and therefore,
discretization of plant models is clearly an additional overhead.
Non-linear and non-algebraic behaviors. CPS Simulink models are
typically highly numeric. They often exhibit non-linear behavior or
may contain non-algebraic functions, making their analysis compli-
cated. In particular, the following operations make Simulink models
non-linear: saturation blocks, switches, polynomial and square-root
functions, and the following operations are non-algebraic and are
not typically supported by SMT-solvers: trigonometry functions,
exponential functions and the logarithm. Finally, matrix operations
are very commonly used in CPS Simulink models and are well-
supported by Matlab. SMT-solvers, however, often do not directly
support matrix operations, and hence, these operations have to be
encoded and expanded as non-matrix formulas. Therefore, the size
of the translations of Simulink models containing such operations
into SMT-based languages become considerably larger than the size
of the original models.
Machine learning models (ML). Machine learning models are
often used at the perception layer of dynamical systems (e.g., for
image processing) or are used to make predictions about certain
behaviors. Verification of models inferred by machine learning
techniques (e.g., Neural Networks) is an open area for research,
as exhaustive verification techniques have only been applied to
relatively simple and small neural network models [23]. As shown
in Table 1, we had one simple example machine learning component
in our benchmark.
Table 1 describes the types of the models in the benchmark by
specifying whether they are open-loop or feedback-loop and also
by indicating what component or feature types are used in each
model. We note that most models are specified as open-loop since
they are in fact sub-systems of a larger system that may have a
feedback-loop architecture. We note that the computation types
described above are not meant to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, our
categorisation provides more detailed information about the func-
tional and behavioral variations in CPSmodels. Further, in Section 5,
we present the results of applying model checking and model test-
ing approaches to our benchmark models, and the categorisation
can further help determine how model checking and model testing
approaches can deal with different computation types.
2.3 CPS Requirements and Patterns
As shown in Figures 1(a) and (b), both model checking and model
testing requiremathematical representations of requirements. Specif-
ically, model checking expects requirements to be described in
temporal or propositional logic, and model testing expects them
to be captured as quantitative fitness functions. Requirements are
properties the system must satisfy and usually constrain inputs and
outputs behaviors. For CPS, model inputs and outputs are signals
(i.e., functions over time). Therefore, the language used to formalize
CPS requirements has to be defined over signal variables. Let [a,b]
s.t. b ≥ a ≥ 0 be an interval of real numbers. We denote signals
by s and define them as s : [a,b] → R where R is the signal range
that can be boolean, enum or an interval of real numbers. We de-
note signals with a boolean or enum range by sB and those with
real intervals or numbers by sR. In this paper, to formally specify
model requirements, we use Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [27], an
extension of the well-known Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [36]
with real-time temporal operators and real-valued constraints. The
syntax of STL is given below.
φ ::= ⊥ | ⊤ | sB | µ rel-op 0 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1U[a,b]φ2
µ ::= n | sR | µ1 math-op µ2 | f (µ) | (µ)
where sB is a boolean-valued signal, sR is a real-valued signal,
rel-op is a relational operator (i.e., ≥, >, <, ≤, =, ,), math-op is a
numeric operator (i.e., +,−,×, /), n is a positive real number (R+0 )
andU[a,b] is a real-time temporal operator. In the above grammar,
f indicates a mathematical function applied to µ such as logarithm
or trigonometry functions.
The semantic of STL is described in the literature [27]. Briefly, φ
formulas, except for (µ rel-op 0), are temporal logic formulas where
U is the temporal until operator. In STL, the temporal until operator
is augmented with an interval [a,b] of real numbers indicating that
the until operator is applied to the signal segment between time
instants a and b. Finally, the temporal eventually operator F can be
written based on the until operator as follows: F[a,b]φ = ⊤U[a,b]φ,
and the globally operatorG can be written asG[a,b]φ = ¬F[a,b]¬φ.
Note that when we write a temporal operator without specifying
a time interval, we assume that the operator applies to the time
interval of its underlying signals. For example, suppose we have
signals defined over time interval [0,T ], we then write Gφ as a
shorthand for G[0,T ]φ.
Before applying model testing or model checking, we first con-
vert the textual requirements in the benchmark into their equiva-
lent STL formulas. Model checking approaches typically receive a
temporal logic property and a model as input. For model testing,
however, we need to transform the logical properties into quantita-
tive fitness functions (see Figure 1). To do so, we use a translation of
STL into a robustness metric [19] which is summarized in Table 3.
The translation function R is defined over a set S = {s1, . . . , sn } of
signals at time t . We assume that the signals in S are defined over
the same time domain, i.e., for every si ∈ S , we have si : [a,b] → Ri
where [a,b] is the common domain between signals in S . The choice
of themax andmin operators for defining the semantics of ∃ and
∀ is standard [24]: the minimum has the same behavior as ∧ and
evaluates whether a predicate holds over the entire time interval.
Dually, the max operator captures ∨.
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Table 3: Translation of Signal Temporal Logic [27] into quan-
titative fitness functions to be used in the model testing ap-
proach in Figure 1(a)
Translation to robustness metric [19, 34]
R(S,t )(⊤) = ϵ R(S,t )(⊥) = −ϵ
R(S,t )(sB) =
{
ϵ if sB
−ϵ if ¬sB R(S,t )(µ = 0) = −|µ(St )|
R(S,t )(µ , 0) =
{
|µ(St )| if µ(St ) , 0
−ϵ else R(S,t )(µ ≥ 0) = µ(St )
R(S,t )(µ > 0) =
{
µ(St ) if µ(St ) , 0
−ϵ else R(S,t )(µ ≤ 0) = −µ(St )
R(S,t )(µ < 0) =
{
−µ(St ) if µ(St ) , 0
−ϵ else
R(S,t )(φ1 ∨ φ2) = max(R(S,t )(φ1),R(S,t )(φ2))
R(S,t )(φ1 ∧ φ2) = min(R(S,t )(φ1),R(S,t )(φ2))
R(S,t )(G[a,b]φ) = min
{
R(S,t ′)(φ)
}
t ′∈[t+a,t+b]
R(S,t )(F[a,b]φ) = max
{
R(S,t ′)(φ)
}
t ′∈[t+a,t+b]
R(S,t )(φ1U[a,b]φ2) = max
{
min
{
R(S,t ′)(φ2),min{R(S,t ′′)(φ1)}t ′′∈[t,t ′]
}}
t ′∈[t+a,t+b]
For every STL property φ and every set S = {s1, . . . , sn } of
signals at time t , we have R(S,t )(φ) ≥ 0 if and only if φ holds over
the set S at time t [19, 34]. That is, we can infer boolean satisfaction
of STL formulas based on their fitness values computed by R. In
Table 3, ϵ is an infinitesimal positive value that is used to ensure
the above relation between boolean satisfiability and fitness values
of real-valued constraints (i.e., µ rel-op 0) and literals (i.e., ⊤, ⊥,
and sB) in the STL grammar.
We translate the requirements in the benchmark Simulink mod-
els into STL. Some examples of STL formulas corresponding to the
requirements in our benchmark are shown in Table 2. For exam-
ple, the formula F[0,T ]G[0,T ] (|out − desired | ≤ 0.01) indicates that
there is a time t ∈ [0,T ] such that for any time t ′ such that t ′ ≥ t ,
the constraint |out(t ′) − desired(t ′)| ≤ 0.01 holds. As an example,
the R translation of this formula is given below:
max
{
min
{
0.01 − |out(t ′) − desired(t ′)|}t ′∈[t,t+T ]}t ∈[0,T ]
To provide more detailed information about the requirements in
our benchmark, we present the recurring temporal patterns in the
STL formulation of our benchmark requirements. Table 4 shows
the temporal patterns we identified in our study. The invariance
pattern, which simply states that a property should hold all the
time, is the most recurring temporal pattern in our Simulink model
benchmark. The other patterns in Table 4 capture common con-
troller requirements, i.e., stability or steady-state, responsiveness,
smoothness, and fairness. Note that in Table 4, the time interval
for G operators are expected to be the same as the time domain
of the signals to which the operators are applied. In Table 5, we
show the list of the temporal patterns appeared in formalisations
of the requirements of each model in our Simulink benchmark. As
this table illustrates, the invariance pattern (T1) is used for some
requirements of every model. The other temporal patterns (i.e.,
T2, T3, T4, and T5) only appear in requirements formalisations of
models that include some continuous controllers (i.e. Autopilot and
Regulator).
Table 4: Temporal patterns in STL translations of our bench-
mark requirements.
Name-ID STL for-
mulation
Explanation
Invariance - T1 Gφ The system should always exhibit the behaviour φ.
Steady State - T2 F[0,d ]Gφ The system within the time duration [0,d] exhibits
the behavior φ and continues exhibiting this behavior
until the end.
Smoothness - T3 G(ψ ⇒ Gφ) Whenever the system exhibits ψ , it has to exhibit φ
until the end.
Responsiveness -
T4
F[0,d ]φ The system shall exhibit φ within the time duration
of [0,d].
Fairness - T5 GF[0,d ]φ At every time t , it should be possible for the system to
exhibit the behaviour φ within the next time duration
[t , t + d].
Table 5: Temporal patterns used in the requirements formal-
isations of each Simulink benchmark model.
Model # Req Patterns Model # Req Patterns
Autopilot 11 T1, T2, T3, T4 Two Tanks 32 T1
Neural
Network
3 T1 Tustin 5 T1
FSM 13 T1 Nonlinear
Guidance
2 T1
Regulator 10 T1, T5 Euler 8 T1
SWIM 2 T1 Effector
Blender
3 T1
Triplex 4 T1
3 OUR MODEL CHECKING TECHNIQUE
SMT-based model checking has a long history of application in
testing and verification of CPS models. Briefly, to check if a model
M meets its requirement r , the requirement is first translated into a
logical propertyφ. An SMT-solver is then used to prove satisfiability
ofM ∧¬φ. IfM ∧¬φ turns out to be SAT, thenM does not satisfy φ.
IfM ∧ ¬φ is UNSAT, it implies thatM satisfies φ. In general, SMT-
basedmodel checkers are focused on checking safety properties (i.e.,
properties expressed using the G temporal operator). The liveness
properties (i.e., properties that use the F temporal operator) can be
expanded assuming that they are specified over a finite time interval.
For example, F[0,d ]φ can be rewritten as
∨
t ∈[0,d ] φ(t) assuming that
[0,d] is discrete time interval.
In our study, for the reasons discussed in Section 1, we use
QVTrace as a representative SMT-based model checking tool for
Simulink. In addition to the standard SMT-based model checking
described above, QVTrace uses the k-induction technique [18] to
enhance the set of formulas it can verify. QVTrace uses a logical
predicate language referred to as QCT to capture requirements.
QCT supports all the numerical and boolean operators described in
STL grammar, but similar to most existing SMT-based model check-
ers, among the temporal operators, it only supports the temporal
operator G, i.e., globally. Hence, among the temporal patterns in
Table 4, QCT can specify T1 and T3 directly. Properties involving
T2, T4 and T5 can be expressed in QCT after we expand them as
discussed earlier. Specifically, as we will discuss in Section 5, the
requirements that used temporal patterns T2, T4 belong to Autopi-
lot that could not be verified using QVTrace due to its complex
features, and the requirement of the Regulator model that used the
T5 pattern was expressed in QCT as a large disjunctive formula
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(i.e., G
∨
t ∈[0,d ] φ(t)). We note that, in general, while being a sub-
set of STL, QCT is sufficiently expressive for most problems we
have seen in practice. In addition, QCT is carefully designed to be
easy to read and understand by a typical engineer who may not
have background in temporal logic. Finally, there is an efficient and
straightforward translation from QCT into the input languages of
SMT-solvers and theorem provers.
When the SMT-based formulation ofM ∧ ¬φ becomes so large
that it cannot be handled by the underlying SMT-solvers, QVTrace
relies on bounded model checking (BMC) [13] mainly to identify
inputs that falsify the model under test. BMC checks the behavior
of the underlying model for a fixed number of steps k to see if
a counter-example with length less than k can be found for the
property of interest. As a result, BMC can only falsify properties
up to a given depth k and is not able to prove the correctness of the
model with respect to a property.
4 OUR MODEL TESTING TECHNIQUE
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in using falsification
methods for testing Simulink models [5, 12, 28]. These methods,
which we refer to as model testing, are black-box and rely on simu-
lation outputs (i.e., model executions) to generate test inputs that
falsify the given requirements. Figure 1(a) shows an overview of our
model testing framework. In our work, we use evolutionary search
algorithms to generate test inputs falsifying a given requirement.
Search algorithms sample the input space, selecting the fittest test
inputs, i.e., test inputs that are (likely) violating or are as close as
possible to violating the requirement under analysis. Then they
evolve the fittest test inputs using genetic or evolutionary opera-
tors to generate new test inputs and reiterate through the search
loop [26]. The test inputs are expected to eventually move towards
the fittest regions in the input space (i.e., the regions containing
fault-revealing test inputs). This approach takes as input: (1) the
model under test, (2) a fitness function guiding the search towards
requirements violations, and (3) the value ranges of the model in-
put variables. We discuss the fitness functions and the input search
space below. We then present a well-known evolutionary search
algorithm used in our work.
Fitness functions are computed based on the model outputs ob-
tained by running the model under test for sampled test inputs. We
use the robustness metric [19] as fitness functions in our work and
use the translation in Table 3 to generate them from STL require-
ments formalizations. The robustness function R(φ) is a value in
[−∞,+∞] such that R(φ) ≥ 0 indicates that φ holds over model
outputs (and hence the test satisfies φ), and R(φ) < 0 shows that φ
is violated (and hence the test reveals a violation). The robustness
metric matches our notion of fitness as its value, when positive,
shows how far a test input is from violating a requirement and
when it is negative, its value shows how severe the failure revealed
by a test is.
Since model testing works by sampling test inputs from the input
search space of the model under test, it requires the value ranges of
the model input variables to be provided. For each Simulink model
in our benchmark, there is a document describing the model func-
tion and its requirements as well as its input and output variables.
We extracted the value ranges of model input variables from these
documents.
In this paper, we use a simple evolutionary search algorithm,
known as hill climbing (HC), to generate test inputs (Algorithm 1).
This algorithm has been previously applied to testing Simulink
models [32]. The algorithm receives the search input space charac-
terization I and uses the fitness function f . It starts with randomly
selected test input in the search space (CS selected in line 2). It
then iteratively modifies the test input (line 4), compares its fitness
value with the fitness value of the best found test input (line 5), and
replaces the best test input when a better candidate is found (line 6).
The search continues until an optimal test input (i.e., yielding a
negative fitness value) is found or we run out of the search time
budget. The test inputs in our work are vectors of boolean, enum
or real variables. Hence, we implement the Tweak operator used in
the HC algorithm by applying a Gaussian Convolution operator [26]
to the real variables and a Bit-Flip operator [26] to the boolean and
enum variables. The Bit-Flip operator randomly toggles a boolean
or an enum value to take another value from its range. A Gaussian
Convolution operator selects a value d from a zero-centered Gauss-
ian distribution (µ = 0, σ 2) and shift the variable to be mutated by
the value of d . The value of σ 2 is in the order of 0.005 when we
want to have an exploitative search operator (i.e., the one focused
on locally search a small area of the search space) and is selected
to be higher (e.g., more than 0.1) when we are interested in more
explorative search.
Algorithm 1 Hill Climbing Algorithm.
1: I : Input Space
2: CS ←initial candidate solution in I
3: repeat
4: NS ← Tweak(Copy(CS))
5: if f (NS) < f (CS) then
6: CS ← NS
7: until CS is the ideal solution or we have run out of time
8: return CS
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we report the results of applying the QVTrace tool
(see Section 3) and our model testing technique (see Section 4) to
our Simulink benchmark models described in Section 2. Specifi-
cally, we seek to answer the following research question: How does
model testing compare with (SMT-based) model checking in finding
requirements violations in Simulink models?
In the following, we explain the experimental setup we used for
the evaluation. Then, we answer our research question based on
the results.
5.1 Experiment Setup
As a prerequisite to apply both model testing and model checking to
the benchmark Simulink models, we translated the textual require-
ments into STL (see Section 2.3). We performed this translation in
collaboration with our industry partner (the fifth and sixth authors
of this paper). We had in total 92 requirements in our Simulink
benchmark that we translated into STL. After that we used the
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translation in Table 3 to convert STL formulas into fitness func-
tions to be used in our model testing approach. As discussed in
Section 3, we further translated STL properties into QCT, the prop-
erty language of QVTrace. We have made the benchmark Simulink
models, their textual requirements and our STL translations of the
requirements available online [2].
After converting textual requirements into fitness functions and
formal properties, we applied model testing and model checking to
the models to identify requirements failures. In the model testing
technique, we used the HC algorithm discussed in Section 4. As
discussed there, we used a Gaussian Convolution operator for the
Tweak operation. In order for the HC search not to get stuck in local
optima, we opt for a relatively large value of σ 2 for the Gaussian
distribution from which the tweak values are chosen. Note that, in
general, it is difficult to select a fixed value for σ 2 to tweak input
variables of different models since these variables have different
value ranges. Hence, for each real-valued input variable v , we set
σ 2 to be 0.1 times the range width of v . We arrived at the value 0.1
through experimentation. If the tweaked values are out of variable
ranges, we cap them at the max or min of the ranges when they are
closer to the max or min, respectively. We set the main loop of HC
(see Algorithm 1) to iterate for 150 times. We chose this number
because, in our preliminary experiments, the HC search has always
reached a plateau after 150 iterations in our experiments. Finally,
in order to account for randomness in HC, for each model and for
each requirement, we executed HC for 30 times.
To apply QVTrace, we first investigate whether it is applicable
to the given model. If so, then QVTrace attempts, in parallel, to ex-
haustively verify the property of interest or to identify input values
falsifying the property. The former is typically performed using
k-induction and the latter is done using bounded model checking
(BMC). QVTrace generates four kinds of outputs: (1) Green, when
the property is exhaustively verified, (2) Red, when input values
violating the property are found, (3) Blue, when the property is
verified upto a bound k , and (4) Orange, when QVTrace fails to
produce any conclusive results due to scalability or other issues. In
this paper, we present the results obtained based on the Z3 SMT
solver [17] since it had better performance than other solvers.
5.2 Results
Table 6 reports the results of applying model testing and model
checking to our Simulink model benchmark. Specifically, for model
testing (MT), we report the number of requirements violations that
we were able to find for each model. Recall that we executed HC
30 times for each requirement. Therefore, in Table 6, we report
for each model and each violated requirement the number of fault
revealing runs of MT. For example, out of 11 requirements in Au-
topilot, MT is able to identify five requirements violations. Three
of these violations were revealed by 30 runs, one of them by four
runs and the last by three runs. Since MT is black-box and analyzes
simulation outputs, it is applicable to any Simulink model that can
be executed. That is, it is applicable to all the benchmark models
and requirements.
For model checking (MC), for each model, we report whether or
not the model or all the requirements of a model could be analyzed
by QVTrace (i.e., if the models and requirements could be translated
into an internal model to be passed into SMT solvers). For the mod-
els and requirements that could be analyzed by QVTrace, we report
in Table 6: (1) the number of requirements that can be checked
exhaustively and proven to be correct, (2) the number of identified
requirements violations, and (3) the number of requirements that
were checked by bounded model checking (BMC) up to a specific
bound k for which no violation was found.
For example, as shown in Table 6, QVTrace was not able to
translate the Autopilot model. This is indicated in the table by
showing that 0 out of the 11 requirements of Autopilot could be
translated internally by QVTrace. However, QVTrace is able to
handle Two Tanks and its 32 requirements. Among these, QVTrace
proves 19 requirements to be correct, finds three requirements
violations and is able to check ten requirements using BMC up to
the following bounds, respectively: k1 . . .k8 ≈ 90, k9 = 110, and
k10 = 260. Specifically, for these ten requirements of Two Tanks,
BMC is able to check the correctness of each requirement ri up to
the depth ki (where 1 ≤ i ≤ 10), but the underlying SMT-solver
fails to produce results for any depth k > ki due to scalability
issues. We note that, for Two Tanks, QVTrace is able to find all
the 11 violations found by MT if the Two Tanks model is modified
such that the tanks are smaller and the tanks’ sensors are closer
together. This is because violations are revealed much earlier in the
simulation outputs of the modified Two Tanks model than in the
outputs of the original model. Finally, for some of the requirements
of some models (i.e., Neural Network, Tustin and Effective Blender),
BMC was not able to prove the requirements of interest for any
bound k . In Table 6, we use k = 0 in the BMC column to indicate
the cases where the SMT-solver failed to produce any results for
k = 1 when the BMC mode of QVTrace is used.
Table 7 compares the time performance of running MT and MC.
On average, across all the models, each run of MT took 5.8min. The
maximum average execution time of an MT run (i.e., 150 iterations
of the HC algorithm) was 18.5min (for Autopilot), and the minimum
average execution time of MT was 3min (for Nonlinear Guidance).
We note that the time required for running MT depends on the
number of search iterations (which in our work is set to 150) as well
as the time required to run a model simulation. The latter depends
on the complexity of the model and the length of the simulation
time duration. Every Simulink model in the benchmark already has
a default simulation time duration that we used in our experiments.
Proving each of the 41 requirements in the benchmark, which
could be exhaustively checked by MC, took only 0.63sec on average.
The Two Tanks requirements required the longest average time
to be proven (1.89sec), and the Euler requirements required the
lowest average time to be proven (0.06sec). On average, it took MC
2.19sec to find 29 requirement violations in the benchmark. For the
17 requirements where BMC had to be tried, we have listed the time
it took for the BMC mode of QVTrace to report an “inconclusive”
output when we try a bound k larger than the maximum bound
values that BMC could handle and are shown in Table 6. We note
that as shown in Table 7, there are variations in the time required
by QVTrace to report “inconclusive”. In particular, in some cases,
it takes several minutes or even hours to report the “inconclusive”
message and in some cases, the message is reported after a few
seconds. This has to do with the internal choices made in QVTrace,
but in either case, the “inconclusive” message indicates that the
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Table 6: Comparing the abilities of model testing andmodel checking in finding requirements violations for Simulinkmodels.
Model Testing (MT) Model Checking (MC)
Model # Reqs. # Violations # Runs Revealing Violations # Translated Reqs # Proven Reqs # Violations #Proven Reqs using BMC up to the Bound k
Autopilot 11 5 3(30/30), 1(4/30), 1(3/30) 0/11 - - -
Two Tanks 32 11 10(30/30), 1(29/30) 32/32 19 3 (11)* 10 (k1, . . .k8 ≈ 90,k9 = 110,k10 = 260)
Neural Network 2 0 - 2/2 0 0 2 (k = 0)
Tustin 5 3 1(30/30), 1(29/30), 1(19/30) 5/5 2 2 1 (k = 0)
FSM 13 6 1(4/30), 1(6/30) 1(12/30), 1(9/30),
2(1/30)
13/13 7 6 0
Nonlinear Guidance 2 2 2(24/30) 2/2 0 2 0
Regulator 10 10 10(30/30) 10/10 0 9 1 (k = 110)
Euler 8 0 - 8/8 8 0 0
SWIM 2 0 - 2/2 2 0 0
Effector Blender 3 2 1(30/30), 1(1/30) 3/3 0 0 3 (k = 0)
Triplex 4 1 2(30/30) 4/4 3 1 0
Total: 92 40 - 81 41 23 17
* QVTrace is able to find three violations when it is applied to the original Two Tanks model. If we modify the Two Tanks model to move the tanks’
sensors closer together and to make the tanks smaller, QVTrace is able to find the eleven violations found by MT. This is because violations are revealed much
earlier in the simulation outputs of the modified Two Tanks model than in the outputs of the original model.
underlying SMT-solver (i.e., Z3) is not able to report results either
because the input to the SMT-solver is too large or because the
solver cannot handle some features in its input.
We note that all the requirements violations were communicated
to Company A who developed the benchmark and were confirmed
as valid violation cases. The results show that all the violations
discovered by MC were also discovered by MT, but there were
violations that MT could discover that could not be identified by
MC. Specifically, there were 17 violations that MT could find but
not MC. Among these, five belonged to the Autopilot model that
could not be handled by MC. The other 12 were among the 17
requirements that had to be checked by BMC, but BMC could not
check the requirements beyond some bound k while the failures
could be revealed by MT at a time step beyond k . Finally, we note
that MC was able to exhaustively prove 41 requirements, whereas
MT, being a testing framework, is focused on fault-finding only. In
Section 6, we discuss the complementary nature of MT and MC
and will draw a few lessons learned based on our results.
In summary, out of the 92 requirements in our benchmark, MT
was able to identify 40 requirement violations and MC only found
23 of them, without detecting additional violations. Among the
40 violations found by MT, 32 were found by more than half of
the runs. This shows, as we have seen before, that one should run
MT as many times as possible. Among the 92 requirements, MC
was able to prove correctness for 41 of them. Finally, MC and MT
together were able to either prove or find violations for 81 of the
92 requirements.
5.3 Data Availability
All the data, code and tool access required to replicate our study are
available online. Specifically, we have made available online [2] the
following: (1) our Simulink benchmark including models, textual
requirements and STL formalisations of the requirements. (2) The
implementation of our model testing technique including fitness
functions obtained based on the STL requirements formalisations.
(3) QCT descriptions of the requirements as well as instructions
on how to access and use QVTrace using a docker virtual machine.
(4) Detailed reports on the results shown in Tables 6 and 7.
6 LESSONS LEARNED
We draw five lessons learned based on our experiment results and
our experience of applying MT and MC to the Simulink benchmark.
Our aim is to identify strengths and weaknesses of the two tech-
niques when they are used to verify Simulink models, and provide
recommendations as to how MC and MT can be combined together
to increase effectiveness of Simulink verification.
Lesson1: MC may fail to analyse some CPS Simulink models. As
confirmed by QRA, the most serious obstacle in adoption of model
checking tools by the CPS industry is that such tools may not be
readily applicable to some industrial Simulink models. In particular,
the inapplicability issue is likely to happen for models capturing
continuous and dynamical systems (e.g., Autopilot). Before one can
apply a model checking tool, such models have to be decomposed
into smaller pieces, their complex features have to be simplified
and the black-box components may have to be replaced by con-
crete implementations. We note that Autopilot could be analyzed
by QVTrace after removing the wind subsystem and discretising
some computations (e.g., by replacing
∫
with sum or d f /dt with
∆f /∆t ). However, such simplifications and modifications may not
be always feasible because: (1) The simplifications may modify the
model behavior and may compromise analysis of some system re-
quirements. This undermines the precision of analysis performed
by MC, and further, some system requirements that are related to
the simplified or removed subsystems can no longer be checked by
MC. (2) Such changes are expensive and require additional effort
that may not be justified in some development environments.
Lesson2: Bounded model checking may fail to reveal violations
that can be, otherwise, easily identified by MT. In our study, bounded
model checking (BMC) has been successfully used for analysis of
17 requirements to which model checking could not be applied
exhaustively. MT, however, was able to reveal violations for 12 of
these 17 requirements. All these violations were obviously revealed
at time steps greater than the selected bounds k in BMC. For ex-
ample, for Two Tanks, MT was able to violate eight requirements
that were proven to be correct by BMC up to a bound less than 270.
But these violations could be revealed at around 500 and 1000 time
steps of Two Tanks outputs.
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Table 7: Comparing the time performance of model testing and model checking.
Model avg. Time
per MT run
avg. Time to
prove reqs
(MC)
avg. Time to
violate reqs
(MC)
BMC Time when QVTrace reports “inconclusive” for bound values k larger than the ones reporter in
Table 6
Autopilot 18.5min - - -
Two Tanks 5.1min 1.89s 1.09s For the ten requirements of Two Tanks that have to be checked by BMC, QVTrace reports “inconclusive” after
approximately 5min.
Neural Network 5.9min - - QVTrace reports “inconclusive” for the two requirements of Neural Network after waiting for 1958.9s (32.6min)
and 847.1s (14.1min), repectively.
Tustin 4.6min 0.19s 0.76s QVTrace reports “inconclusive” for one requirement of Tustin after waiting for 1121s (18.7min) .
FSM 3.6min 0.59s 0.18s -
Nonlinear Guidance 3min - 0.12s -
Regulator 3.6min - 10.1s QVTrace reports “inconclusive” for one requirement of Regulartor after waiting for 1303.3s (21.7min).
Euler 4.5min 0.06s - -
SWIM 5.2min 0.18s - -
Effector Blender 4.4min - - QVTrace reports “inconclusive” for two requirements of Effector Blender after waiting for 9475.4s (2.6h) and
4371.9s (1.2h), respectively. For the third requirement of Effector Blender, QVTrace reports “inconclusive” after
only 37.8s.
Triplex 5.6min 0.88s 0.88s -
Average 5.8min 0.63s 2.19s -
Lesson3: MC executes considerably faster than MT when it can
prove or violate requirements. However, MC may quickly fail to scale
when models grow in size and complexity.MC executes considerably
faster than MT when it can conclusively prove or violate a require-
ment and does not warrant the use of BMC. While it took MC less
than a couple of seconds, on average, to prove properties or to find
violations for the benchmark, the quickest run of MT took about
3min. While for small models, MC is quicker than MT, this trend
unlikely holds for larger and more complex models. In particular,
MC has the worst performance for Autopilot, Neural Network and
Effector Blender that have complex features such as continuous
dynamics, non-algebraic functions and machine learning compo-
nents. Some of the limitations, however, are due to the underlying
SMT-solvers.
Lesson4: MT approaches, though effective at finding violations,
need to be made more efficient on large models. In this paper, we
used a relatively simple model testing approach implemented based
on a Hill-Climbing algorithm guided by existing fitness functions
proposed in the literature. MT approaches can be improved in
several ways to increase their effectiveness and practical usability.
In particular, MT is computationally expensive as it requires to run
the underlying model a large number of times. Since different runs
of MT are totally independent, an easy way to rectify this issue
is to paralellize the MT runs, in particular, given that multicore
computers are now a commodity. In addition, there are several
strands of research that investigate different search heuristics or
attempt to combine search algorithms with surrogate models to
reduce their computational time (e.g., [6, 30]).
Lesson5:More empirical research is required to better understand
what search heuristics should be used for what types of models. En-
gineers are provided with little information and guidelines as to
how they should select search heuristics to obtain most effective
results when they use MT. Each run of MT samples and executes
a large number of test inputs. The generated data, however, apart
from guiding the search, is not used to draw any information about
the degree of complexity of the search problem at hand or to pro-
vide any feedback to engineers as to whether they should keep
running MT further or whether they should modify the underlying
heuristics of their search algorithms. We believe further research is
needed in this direction to make MTmore usable and more effective
in practice.
Combining MC and MT. Our experience shows that MT and
MC are complementary. MC can effectively prove the correctness of
requirements when it is able to handle the size and the complexity
of the underlying models and properties, while MT is effective in
finding requirements violations. Indeed, for our benchmark, MC
and MT together are able to prove 41 requirements and find 40
violations, leaving only 11 requirements (i.e.,%12) inconclusive.
Given that MC is quite fast in proving and violating requirements,
we can start by applying MC first and then proceed with MT when
models or requirements cannot be handled by MC or its underlying
SMT-solvers.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented an industrial Simulink model bench-
mark and used this benchmark to evaluate and compare capabilities
of model checking and model testing techniques for finding require-
ments violations in Simulink models. Our results show that our
model checking technique is effective and efficient in proving cor-
rectness of requirements on Simulink models that represent CPS
components. However, as Simulink models become larger and more
complex, in particular, when they involve complex non-algebraic
or machine-learning components or exhibit continuous dynamic
behaviour, it becomes more likely that model checking or bounded
model checking fail to handle them or identify faults in them. On
the other hand, while our model testing technique can scale to large
and complex CPS models and identify some of their faults, it is still
computationally expensive and does not provide any quidelines on
what search heuristics should be used for what types of models. In
the end, we believe combing the two techniques is the best way
ahead. We also believe more studies comparing the performance
of these techniques in different contexts can help researchers bet-
ter identify limitations and strengths of these two main-stream
automated verification techniques.
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